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Soul increasingly reduced to observable mental or bodily processes.
Locke: denies innate ideas—soul as tabula rasa, a passive receiver. Start of the NATURE / NURTURE debate.
Hume: rejects a persistent self; mind is a bundle of perceptions.
La Mettrie: human soul is an effect of bodily mechanisms (*L'homme machine*).
Diderot and French materialists view soul as an illusion of matter in motion.
Mind-body dualism increasingly replaced by monist materialism.
Soul or mind functions through the association of ideas.
David Hartley: vibrations in nerves correspond to mental associations.
Mind explained through natural laws, not metaphysical substances.
Emphasizes memory, habit, and experience over rational soul.
Bridge between empiricism and early psychology.
Shift from soul as essence to mind as structure of learned relations.